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According to the subjective Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics (QBism), the instru-
ments used to measure quantum systems are to be regarded as an extension of the senses of the
agent who is using them, and quantum states describe the agent’s expectations for what they will
experience through these extended senses. How can QBism then account for the fact that (i) in-
struments must be calibrated before they can be used to ‘sense’ anything; (ii) some instruments are
more precise than others; (iii) more precise instruments can lead to discovery of new systems? Fur-
thermore, is the agent ‘incoherent’ if they prefer to use a less precise instrument? Here we provide
answers to these questions.
I. INTRODUCTION
QBism is an interpretation of quantum mechanics ac-
cording to which quantum states quantify an Agent’s
subjective degrees of belief about their future personal
experiences (Events). According to QBism, quantum
theory itself is not meant to describe an external world
independently of observation; rather, quantum theory
is best understood as a normative addition to standard
probability theory, that is to say, it is a rule constraining
an Agent’s subjective probability assignments for the re-
sults of measurements on quantum systems. Normative
rules are founded upon the principle of coherence: an
Agent must strive to hold beliefs that are ‘Dutch book
coherent’ (that is, which would not imply a sure loss if
the Agent were to make bets according to them), and
that are coherent with the world (i.e. that accommodate
lessons learned from past experiences).
QBism is thereby able to avoid at least one aspect of
the measurement problem, the ‘problem of definite re-
sults’, which seeks to explain why a measurement of a
quantum system leads to a single result. QBism takes
the personal experience of any Agent as fundamental; as
such, the occurrence of definite results is a basic postulate
that does not need to be derived or explained within the
theory. Moreover, by insisting that the relevant definite
results are Events that are personal to the Agent who
experiences them, QBism also evades the teeth of the
dilemmas posed by the EPR ‘paradox’ and Bell’s theo-
rem [1].
Despite these advantages, QBism’s radical stance on
the nature of measurement renders it vulnerable to an-
other line of attack, concerning the status of the mea-
suring apparatus. The question is a simple and natural
one: should the physical devices that we scientists em-
ploy in order to obtain the results of our measurements
be themselves treated as measured systems external to
the Agent who uses them, or should they be treated as
being on par with the perceptual organs of the Agent,
giving them an essentially direct experience of the mea-
sured system? Put in concrete terms, when a scientist
uses a Stern-Gerlach apparatus to discern the spin of an
electron, is the relevant Event that the electron is expe-
rienced as having, say, spin ‘up’, or is it that a small dot
is experienced to appear on the upper half of the glass
screen?
To their credit, QBists have been unequivocal in their
answer, which is that the apparatus is to be regarded as
essentially part of the Agent. This standpoint represents
a key way in which QBism departs from a Copenhagen-
like interpretation in the spirit of Bohr. For example,
Fuchs writes [2]:
QBism, in contrast, takes the idea of ‘the
instruments of observation as a ... prolon-
gation of the sense organs of the observer’
deadly seriously and runs it to its logical con-
clusion. This is why QBists opt to say that
the outcome of a quantum measurement is
a personal experience for the agent gambling
upon it. Whereas Bohr always had his classi-
cally describable measuring devices mediat-
ing between the registration of a measure-
ment’s outcome and the individual agent’s ex-
perience, for QBism the outcome just is the
experience.
Stranger than the QBists’ firm adherence to this some-
what unintuitive stance is the fact that nobody has crit-
icised it. Yet it is a ripe target: do QBists really think
that a scientist directly experiences the spin of an elec-
tron to be ‘up’, in a manner not fundamentally different
to experiencing, say, that the orientation of a weather-
vane is North? If that is so, then how does the QBist
account for the fact that the apparatuses used to experi-
ence Events typically require laborious tuning and cali-
bration, and must be used by a skilled and highly trained
individual, whereas the orientation of weather-vanes can
be checked effortlessly by any sighted person? Further-
more, the QBists would have it that an Agent equipped
with an apparatus is to be treated as essentially distinct
from an Agent without such equipment. Yet no scientist
enters the lab for the first time already proficient with the
equipment, and once they are proficient, it seems peculiar
to say that they have become an entirely different Agent.
What, then, is the connection between the equipped and
unequipped Agent?
2Finally, QBism has provided no clarification as to what
makes one apparatus superior to another. This means
the QBist, to date, has no compelling counter to the con-
ventional narrative that measuring devices of increasing
refinement more closely approximate the ‘true’ values of
the measured quantities. Since QBism rejects the no-
tion that there is an independently exisiting and objec-
tive ‘true’ value of any quantity, it is apparently unable
to explain how scientific instruments can progress to ever
increasing levels of precision and refinement. If QBism
is to meet this challenge, it must provide a criterion for
comparing apparatuses and identifying which ones are
‘more precise and refined’ than others, compatible with
QBism’s tenets. The aim of this work is to fill in this gap
by supplying precise answers to all the above questions
within the QBist interpretation.
Outline of the paper: In the next part, we give a
detailed overview of QBism, its key concepts and formal
structure. In section III we further clarify what is meant
by an ‘extension of the agent’ on a QBist interpretation,
and propose a formal definition. In Sec. IV we make a
connection to the resource theory of quantum measure-
ments and use it to classify and compare the different
types of Agent extensions. In particular, we provide a
QBist notion of ‘refinement’ that makes no reference to
pre-existing ‘true’ values of measured quantities.
II. OVERVIEW OF QBISM
In this section, we give a self-contained introduction
to QBism, covering its basic premises including its treat-
ment of measurements, coherence, and the Born rule. We
will find it necessary to further elaborate on the QBist
definition of a ‘system’ and on the notion of the Agent’s
physical body in more detail than can be found in previ-
ous works.
1. Event, Agent and World
In QBism, an element of reality is an experience, which
contains as a fundamental internal structure a pairing of
an experiencing subject with an experienced object; such
experiences are called Events. (In this work, we use cap-
italization to denote concepts that are personal to the
experiencing subject; thus the personal Events are to be
distinguished from the impersonal or objective ‘events’
commonly found in physics textbooks.) Take, for in-
stance, the Event of biting into a cookie. The features
of the Event may include the taste of raisins, the feel-
ing of surprise and disappointment at not tasting choco-
late chips, the feeling of grasping the cookie, and so on.
Among other things, these features implicate an Agent
(the one who tastes, feels, etc.), who has a body (a tongue
to taste, hands to grasp, etc.), and also a personal ex-
ternal World (the thing to be tasted and grasped, i.e.
the target of the Agent’s experiences). The notions of
Event, embodied Agent, and World, are all fundamental
in QBism. They frame and underpin all subjective ex-
periences, from mundane commonplace experiences like
eating cookies, to sophisticated and theory-laden experi-
ences like measuring quantum systems. Even more, the
extent to which scientific knowledge is ‘objective’ must
be understood as arising from the inter-subjective expe-
riences of many Agents.
Every Event refers to some particular Agent, and so it
is both real and personal to the Agent that experiences
it. The features of an Event are what is ‘directly expe-
rienced’ by the Agent, that is, immediately and without
the need of conscious reflection or interpretation. Note
that the QBist notion of ‘direct experience’ is intended to
be rich enough to capture aspects of perception beyond
mere ‘sense-data’; the Agent’s emotions, memories, and
expectations all play a role in shaping this experience.
For example, a chess grandmaster looking at the state
of a game in progress may be said to directly experience
that Black is in a strong position, because this may be
clear to them at a glance. We would not say the same of a
novice, who would only directly experience the positions
of the pieces on the board, and would have to do con-
scious work to deduce or infer Black’s advantage in the
game. (Incidentally, there is perhaps a sense in which
the grandmaster’s training has given them a ‘mental ap-
paratus’ not unlike a physical apparatus.)
Since the Agent and World represent internal aspects
of Events, one should be careful not to think of the Agent
and the World as being causes of the Events, at least not
on any standard reading of causality that physicists have
used; we will say more about this in Sec. II 2. While the
meaning of causality in QBism has yet to be fully expli-
cated, this much can be said: the status of an individual
Event in QBism is comparable to that of the ‘big bang’
in standard cosmology, in that it has no causes within
the theory that describes it, and may be regarded for
theoretical purposes as essentially un-caused. In the case
of QBism, of course, there is not one but a multitude of
such primordial Events that make up the fabric of real-
ity. The Events are, to use Wheeler’s words, ‘elementary
acts of observer participancy’, which led him to say ‘yes’
when asked ‘is the big bang here?’ (see [3] and discussion
in [4]).
This might seem to pose a challenge to the idea of
scientific explanation, but this can be met provided one
is willing to adopt a more flexible notion of what ‘ex-
planation’ means. In QBism, scientific explanation does
not seek to identify the causes of the elements of real-
ity; rather, the occurrence of Events is a basic premise
from which scientific analysis proceeds. The explanation
for a phenomenon, such as the occurrence of an unex-
pected Event, is to be sought in making it coherent with
the Agent’s interconnected mesh of beliefs. The Agent
seeks to achieve this by adjusting their interpretation of
the meaning of the Event and/or revising their existing
beliefs. An unexplained event is one that has low prob-
3ability given the Agent’s beliefs and past experience; in
short, an occurrence that the Agent continues to find
surprising even in hindsight. An explained event is the
opposite: one whose occurrence, though it may have sur-
prised the Agent at the time, is attributed a high prob-
ability in light of the Agent’s current (possibly revised)
beliefs. To give more detail than this brief sketch would
take us beyond the scope of the present work.
One of the stated goals of QBism is to clearly sepa-
rate what is subjective and objective in quantum theory.
To do this, QBism calls for a radical revision of what
these terms mean in physics. Unlike other interpreta-
tions, QBism does not regard ‘real’ as being synonymous
with ‘objective’. QBism begins with the premise that re-
ality is intrinsically subjective, and proceeds to ask how
objective knowledge comes about in this context. The
QBist interpretation of quantum theory starts from the
assertion that quantum states represent an Agent’s sub-
jective probabilities about subjective Events that may
happen to them. The objective content of quantum the-
ory therefore is not localized in states or measurement
results, but rather resides in more holistic structural fea-
tures of the theory that apply equally to all Agents. The
identification of objective features of this kind is one of
the main ongoing projects of QBism.
2. Measurements
Given that Events are infinitely rich and variable in
their qualities, it is not feasible to enumerate all possible
Events that may occur at the next moment, let alone as-
sign them probabilities. The first step in making sense
of the world as a scientist is to quantify the possibilities
as belonging to some discrete set. Thus, when I measure
the length of a table, I do not consider the innumer-
able different experiences I might have in measuring it,
nor even the innumerable ways that I might perform the
measurement – I only consider the single coarse-grained
action of ‘measuring the table length’, and the resulting
value in (say) millimeters that I am able to discern with
my eye. I judge the table to be between 1000 and 2000
mm, so although my possible experiences on measuring
the table are innumerable, there are only 1000 distinct
possible Events that will describe my quantified experi-
ence of ‘measuring the table length’. More generally, a
measurement refers to an Event that is characterized by
the following two features:
(i) A quantified deliberate action by the Agent (the ‘mea-
surement action’);
(ii) A quantified response of the World (the ‘measure-
ment result’).
We avoid using the terms ‘setting’ and ‘outcome’ for these
categories because common usage would have a ‘setting’
refer to, say, the experimenter’s turning a dial to some
value on an apparatus, and the associated ‘outcome’ to
some uncontrolled or dependent variable, say, the trig-
gering of a photon detector, but this usage does not cor-
respond to our notions of action and result. According to
our usage, the ‘setting’ refers to an Event, i.e. an action-
result pair, whose action is turning the dial, and whose
result is seeing the dial come to rest at a certain position;
the ‘outcome’ refers to another Event whose action is to
listen for the clicks of the detector at some time, and
whose result is hearing the detector click (or not). The
difference between the two is not a matter of type, but
merely of the degree to which the Agent judges the mea-
surement result to depend on the their voluntary actions
in each case. For instance, in turning a dial with our
hand, we generally expect to see it come to rest at the
intended value, and so would be inclined to call the Event
a ‘setting’; by contrast, our expectation about whether
the detector will click is usually judged to be independent
of our voluntary act of listening for the click, and so the
Event tends to be classified an ‘outcome’.
Furthermore, whereas it is standard to regard ‘set-
tings’ as causes of ‘outcomes’, an action is not interpreted
na¨ıvely as the cause of its associated result, because both
arise together in the very moment that the Event occurs
to which they pertain. This kind of relation is not causal
in a deterministic sense, nor is it causal by the definitions
commonly used in statistical causal modeling (e.g. that
of Pearl [5]). While it is possible to define causal relations
of the latter kind between measurement Events such as
settings and outcomes (see Ref. [6] for a program along
these lines), the same cannot be said for the action-result
pair, which co-arise together within a single Event.
We mention that this kind of ‘co-arising’ relation does
have precedents in the philosophical literature. Accord-
ing to William James:
Your acquaintance with reality grows literally
by buds or drops of perception. Intellectually
and on reflection you can divide these into
components, but as immediately given, they
come totally or not at all. [7]
Similarly, Whitehead spoke of ‘actual entities’ [8],
Husserl of ‘intentional experiences’, and Merleu-Ponty of
‘sensations’. All of these ideas reject a formal splitting
into ‘cause’ and ‘effect’. For instance, Merleu-Ponty as-
serts that
in this transaction between the subject of sen-
sation and the sensible it cannot be held that
one acts while the other suffers the action, or
that one confers significance on the other. [9]
This shows that philosophy may provide further insight
as to how QBism might interpret relations that are inter-
nal to Events, such as the action-result and Agent-World
relations.
To quantify an Event, the Agent decides upon a fi-
nite, discrete set of possibilities for the measurement ac-
tion (say, ‘measure the table length’ or ‘set the oven
dial to 250 degrees’) and similarly for each measure-
ment result (say 1000-2000mm, and 100-400◦, respec-
tively). Explicitly, let a ∈ A denote the set of possible
4actions and x ∈ Xa the set of possible results of ac-
tion A = a. The sample space consists of the quantified
Events {(Xa = x) : ∀x ∈ Xa, ∀a ∈ A}, which we label as
ordered pairs (a, x). For each possible action, the Agent
assigns probabilities {Pa(x) : ∀x ∈ Xa}, which quantifies
how likely they think the Event (a, x) is to occur. By
assumption, the Agent can only be uncertain about the
value of the feature x (which belongs to their external
World) and not about the value a of their own action.
Consequently, the probabilities satisfy
∑
x∈Xa
Pa(x) = 1 , ∀a ∈ A . (1)
3. Coherence
QBism regards probabilities as a means of quantifying
the subjective degrees of belief of an Agent. As such,
QBism embraces a subjective Bayesian interpretation of
probability theory. On the subjective Bayesian account,
there is no such thing as a ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ probability
assignment, not even by degrees. Rather, the emphasis
is placed on whether or not an Agent’s set (or ‘mesh’) of
beliefs is internally coherent. Coherence is understood as
a relation among beliefs, so while it does not constrain
any individual belief, it constrains an Agent’s beliefs as a
whole and serves to define an organizing structure for be-
lief that is equally applicable to every Agent. In practice,
coherence is defined negatively, by positing the conditions
under which it is violated. The strongest notion of coher-
ence is Dutch book coherence. This type of coherence is
violated if, given the Agent’s probability assignments for
a set of Events, a ‘Dutch book’ can be constructed from
them, which is a set of bets (say, proposals to buy or sell
lottery tickets to the Events at certain prices) such that
the Agent considers each bet worthwhile when taken indi-
vidually, but when taken together they imply a sure loss
for the Agent. It can be shown that failure to conform
to the basic axioms of probability theory (e.g. making
probability assignments that are negative or don’t sum
to one) implies the existence of a Dutch book, and so
the probability calculus can be justified on the grounds
of Dutch book coherence [10].
Dutch book coherence alone is not enough to capture
all that is meant by ‘coherence’ in an Agent’s beliefs. The
most prominent example is the rule of Bayesian updat-
ing, which determines the probability P1(H) an Agent
should assign to an Event H , in light of some new Event
E, given that the Agent’s beliefs prior to E’s occur-
rence were given by P0(H), P0(E), P0(E|H). The rule
of Bayesian updating stipulates that:
P1(H) := P0(H |E) , (2)
where P0(H |E) = P0(E|H)P0(H)/P0(E). (The latter
identity, which relates beliefs at a single time, should
not be confused with Bayesian updating just described,
which relates the Agent’s present beliefs to their prior
beliefs at an earlier time). Failing to update one’s beliefs
according to (2) does not make one vulnerable to a Dutch
book, and indeed there can be situations where ignoring
the rule (2) makes sense [11]. What then could motivate
an Agent to impose the constraint (2) on their beliefs?
It seems that coherence is about more than just striv-
ing to avoid a Dutch book: it is also about adhering to
certain constraints on one’s beliefs that are inspired by
perceived regularities in one’s experience. For instance,
Galileo’s equation for the height of a falling body released
from rest may be thought of as expressing a normative
rule: that the Event of releasing the object from a fixed
initial height would constrain an Agent’s beliefs about
it’s height at subsequent times. Unlike Dutch book co-
herence, which seems largely independent of the partic-
ular features of the world we live in, normative rules like
Bayesian updating or falling under gravity are more con-
tingent on one’s actual experiences. For example, an as-
tronaut would not find reason to adhere to the ‘normative
rule of falling’ just described. We therefore propose that
such normative additions to probability theory, includ-
ing the rule of Bayesian updating, should be interpreted
as being founded on ‘World-coherence’, as distinct from
Dutch book coherence.
4. The Born rule
According to QBism, the difference between quantum
and classical theory hinges on the form of a particular
normative addition to probability theory that describes
how the results of a hypothetical measurement (one that
is not actually performed) constrain the Agent’s beliefs
about an actual measurement.
To illustrate, consider a possible measurement that you
could perform on a box of chocolates, say, counting them.
Suppose that you are presented with a closed box, for
which you assign the prior probability p(i) that you would
find i chocolates inside, if you were to open it. Now
imagine that you are asked to weigh the box, without
opening it.
Evidently, your probabilities q(j) for the unopened box
to weigh j grams should be related to your probability as-
signment p(i) for what you would find if you were to open
it. In other words, your probability assignments p(i) for a
hypothetical measurement that is not performed, never-
theless constrain your beliefs about a different measure-
ment q(j) that is to be performed.
More realistically, your probability assignment q(j)
would also depend on the properties of the scale used
to weigh the box. Consider a box in which you are sure
to find i chocolates (that is, if you were to open it and
count them) and let r(j|i) be your probability that the
scale would read ‘j’ if such a box were placed upon it.
The set of r(j|i) for all values of i characterizes your
beliefs about the functioning of the weighing scale. In
general, then, your probabilities q(j) for weighing any
given box of chocolates should be constrained by a rule
5of the general form:
q(j) = F [p(i), r(j|i)] . (3)
This relation is not enforced by any Dutch book argu-
ment, rather, it is a normative addition to probability
theory, enforced by World-coherence based on your pre-
vious dealings with boxes of chocolate and kitchen scales.
In order to generalize this rule to hold for any mea-
surement we might conceivably perform, whose outcomes
we continue to label j, we must choose our hypothetical
i-measurement to be much more thorough than merely
counting the chocolates. It would have to be a mea-
surement for which the probabilities p(i) would suffice to
constrain the probabilities of any alternative measure-
ment via some rule of the form (3); such a measurement
is called informationally complete (IC).
Thus, in our example, we might imagine for our i-
measurement not just counting the chocolates, but si-
multaneously measuring their sizes, weighing them, tak-
ing their temperature, and so on. In general, depending
on the choice of IC-measurement, the resulting form of
the relation F could be rather complicated. This is es-
pecially true if the measurement somehow disturbs the
system (for instance if chocolates get eaten during the
process), for then the function F must correct for the
effects of this disturbance. It is a remarkable feature of
our classical theories that they always permit (in princi-
ple) an IC-measurement that is entirely non-disturbing.
Formally, ‘non-disturbing’ means that, for the purpose of
assigning the probabilities q(j), the Agent is indifferent
between the following two circumstances:
(i) the IC-measurement is performed, and its outcome i
is ignored;
(ii) the IC-measurement is not performed at all.
Therefore, the statement that the IC-measurement is
‘non-disturbing’ amounts to the normative constraint
q(j) = s(j) , (4)
where s(j) is the probability for the result j given that the
IC-measurement is performed and the outcome i ignored.
Since an Agent is free to judge a measurement to be non-
disturbing or not depending on past experience, (4) is an
instance of World-coherence.
The form of s(j) is constrained by a basic result of
probability theory (derivable from Dutch book coher-
ence) called the Law of Total Probability:
s(j) =
∑
i
r(j|i)p(i) . (5)
Combining this with (4), we obtain the form of the
normative rule (3) applicable to non-disturbing IC-
measurements:
q(j) =
∑
i
r(j|i)p(i) . (6)
Although this looks superficially similar to the Law of
Total Probability, note that whereas (5) is a consequence
of Dutch book coherence, (6) depends also on (4) and
so is contingent on World-coherence. In particular, an
Agent will always adhere to (5), but experience may give
them reason to reject (6). We will soon consider an alter-
native to (6) that applies when the Agent believes that
the system in question is a quantum system.
First note that, since the rule (6) allows one to calcu-
late q(j) for any measurement whatsoever on the system
(by virtue of the i-measurement being informationally
complete) it encodes the Agent’s beliefs about all possi-
ble measurements on the system. By fixing the choice
of IC-measurement according to some convention, which
we call the reference measurement, we can interpret the
probabilities p(i) that the Agent would assign to the ref-
erence measurement as representing the ‘state’ of a sys-
tem.
One of the features that distinguishes quantum me-
chanics from classical physics is that there is no IC-
measurement for which the function F takes the sim-
ple form of (6). There is, however, an information-
ally complete measurement that closely approximates
it, called a symmetric informationally complete POVM
(SIC-POVM) [12]. With this choice of reference mea-
surement, the normative rule becomes:
q(j) =
d2∑
i
[
(d+ 1)p(i)−
1
d
]
r(j|i) , (7)
which is called the Urgleichung, and it can be derived
straightforwardly from the Born rule [13]. Here, d is
interpretable as the number of perfectly distinguishable
states of the system (its ‘informational dimension’) and
also corresponds to the dimension of the system in the
Hilbert space formulation of quantum theory. QBism
proposes that (7) encodes the Agent’s beliefs about all
possible measurements on a system, when that system is
judged to be quantum. Conversely, if experience leads
the Agent to use a rule of the form (7) instead of (6),
we may take this as defining what we mean when we say
the system ‘is quantum’. Using (7), we can interpret the
‘quantum state’ as meaning the set of probabilities p(i)
that an Agent would assign to the result i of a hypothet-
ical reference SIC-POVM on a quantum system.
The normative rule (7) is not to be understood as
a replacement for the classical rule (6). The latter re-
mains useful in situations where there exists a measure-
ment that is effectively non-disturbing and IC relative to
the set of possible measurements the Agent can perform,
which may occur when this set is sufficiently limited, say,
by the precision of the Agent’s apparatuses. However,
when the possible measurements on a system become rich
enough to exhibit quantum phenomena, the appropriate
normative rule is (7). That is why QBists say the latter is
an addition to the Agent’s repertoire of normative rules,
rather than a replacement of any existing rules. As an
analogy, the theory of General Relativity does not replace
Newtonian Gravity as a predictive tool, but rather sup-
plements it in those domains where the latter no longer
yields results that agree with experiments.
6Although it is currently unknown whether SIC-
POVMs exist for Hilbert spaces of all dimensions, QBists
prefer to adopt SICs as the reference measurement of
choice, because the simple form of (7) lends it to being
taken as an axiom for a probabilistic reconstruction of
quantum theory that does not assume the Hilbert space
representation [13]. Even if SICs do not always exist,
one can still get a uniquely quantum (albeit more compli-
cated) expression for (3) by using other IC constructions.
For instance, minimal IC-POVMs, which have exactly d2
outcomes, exist in all dimensions [14, 15].
In the remaining two subsections, we will elaborate
on two features that have remained relatively under-
developed in QBist literature. The first is of a more tech-
nical nature and concerns what is meant by a ‘system’,
while the latter examines the QBist understanding of the
Agent’s perceptions and their body.
5. Systems
So far QBists have taken for granted that an Agent
can identify and repeatedly address individual ‘systems’
within their external World. Since there is no guarantee
a priori that different Agents will agree on what sys-
tem is being addressed by a given measurement, we will
capitalize ‘System’ henceforth to indicate the System as
judged by an individual Agent.
The problem of identifying the System can be framed
as follows. Suppose an Agent is contemplating do-
ing a measurement chosen from a set indexed by k =
1, 2, . . . ,K. Let qk(j) be the probabilities they assign
to the results j = 1, 2, . . . , Jk of the k-th measurement.
What can it mean to say that these K measurements are
all addressing the same System S of dimension d? Usu-
ally QBists begin by stipulating that this is the case, and
then concluding that there must exist a density matrix
ρ and a POVM {E
(k)
j : j = 1, 2, . . . , Jk} for each k, such
that the probability assignments may be written as:
qk(j) = Tr
[
ρE
(k)
j
]
. (8)
Recalling our discussion of the previous section, we can
equivalently express this condition as saying that there
must exists an assignment of probabilities p(i) to a hypo-
thetical SIC-POVM with outcomes i = 1, 2, . . . , d2, and
a set of K conditional probability distributions rk(j|i),
such that the agent’s probability assignments may be
written as:
qk(j) :=
d2∑
i
[
(d+ 1)p(i)−
1
d
]
rk(j|i) ∀ k .
(9)
Thus, the usual approach assumes that the Agent has
some independent reasons for judging a set of measure-
ments to be addressing a single System, and then imposes
(9) as a necessary constraint on the Agent’s probability
assignments that follows from this belief. In the present
work, we propose that this logic can also be inverted. For
suppose that an Agent has independent reasons to assign
the set of probability distributions {qk(j) : ∀k}, and they
just so happen to notice that there exist valid distribu-
tions p(i) and {rk(j|i) : ∀k} such that the constraint (9)
holds. Then the Agent is licensed to postulate that these
measurements are all addressing the same System.
This provides us with a means by which the ability to
perform new measurements can lead to the discovery of
new Systems that were not suspected prior to performing
the measurements. This is important because, if Systems
always had to be presupposed before we could talk about
measurements upon them, then an Agent would have no
means of discovering new Systems through the increased
refinement of their measuring Apparatus. By allowing
that the ability to perform new measurements may log-
ically precede the identification of the Systems to which
they are targeted, we enable QBism to account for the
discovery of new Systems through the application of new
Apparatuses.
Finally, we remark on an interesting feature of the form
of (9). The probabilities qk(j) on the LHS are taken to
refer to a single measurement Event. However, the RHS
of the equation (9) ‘splits up’ these probabilities into two
parts. The first part, p(i), is independent of the Agent’s
choice of measurement k, and so we may interpret it as
assigning the ‘state’ of the System independently of how
it is measured. The second part, rk(j|i), encodes the
Agent’s possible experiences for any state of the System;
as such we may interpret it as characterizing the response
of an Apparatus independently of any particular state.
Thus, the Event anticipated by the probabilities qk(j) is
thereby conceptually dissected into the union of a System
in a state p(i) and an Apparatus delineated by rk(j|i),
which we will shortly associate to the Agent’s body.
6. The body of the Agent
The features of an Event contain information about
the sensory body of the Agent. As an example, consider
driving over a bump in the road. Here are two distinct
but equally natural ways of describing the experience:
(1) ‘I was driving along on the road when I went over a
bump’.
(2) ‘I was driving along in my car when the car went
over a bump’.
In case (1) the driver’s attention is on the road.
Although driving a car, this Agent is not aware of the
car as a separate external entity. Rather, impacts to
the car, such as the bump, are perceived directly by
the Agent; the car is, for all intents and purposes, an
extension of the Agent’s body. By contrast, the phrasing
in example (2) makes it clear that the driver’s attention
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not directly felt, but is inferred through the jolting of the
car; the latter is felt directly by the Agent’s corporeal
body seated in it. We have in effect two different Agents
and hence two different personal Events, which may be
stated more explicitly as:
Event 1: Agent 1 feels a bump in the road.
Event 2: Agent 2 feels a jolt in the car seat.
We chose this example because of its nearness to com-
monplace experience: most people have experienced driv-
ing over a bump in each of these two ways. Usually, as
a driver, one is more aware of the road and less aware
of the car, and so will tend to experience the car as an
extension of their own sensory body, whereas a passenger
will tend to be more aware of the movements of the car
seat, and their sensory body effectively ends at their own
skin. But much more exotic ways of experiencing the
event could be imagined. A more sensitive and attentive
driver might be able to directly feel not only the pres-
ence but also the precise shape of the bump; at the other
extreme, a passenger deep in meditation might experi-
ence the bump not directly by the jolting of the seat but
by the associated changes in their internal bodily state –
an increase in heart rate, slight movement of the organs,
etc. Each way of experiencing the bump corresponds to
a distinct placement of the boundary between the Agent
and the World, part of which implicitly delineates the
physical boundary of the Agent’s sensory organs, which
may be natural or artificial. In our present formalism,
this choice enters in how we interpret the events Xa to
which we assign probabilities, that is, to what specific
distinctive experiences the values x ∈ Xa represent.
For the purposes of giving a scientific but personalist
description of any occurrence, we must make a definite
choice of the Agent/World boundary (and hence of the
Agent’s effective body). Whether a choice is appropriate
or inappropriate is to be judged primarily by the scien-
tist whose experience is being described, for only they can
know what they felt to be the boundaries of their own
senses. If we wish to speak of Agents and Events in the
abstract, without describing actual experiences and hap-
penings, then we may be content so long as our choice of
the Agent’s sensory body is a plausible one (i.e. that the
experiences thereby described are possible experiences for
us in our role as scientists) and provided we remain con-
sistent in this choice and do not move it around without
explicitly acknowledging that we are doing so.
It is worth noting that our example of driving over
a bump highlights the problem of objectivity in QBism.
We have here something that would ordinarily be treated
as a single unique event, namely, ‘the car went over the
bump’, and interpreted it instead as a variety of funda-
mentally distinct Agents and Events. Yet all of these
fractions involve ostensibly the ‘same’ physical entities –
a person, a car, and a bump. The question then arises as
to how this conceptual unity comes about, that is, how it
is possible to resolve the objective ‘person’ and ‘event’ out
of the myriad possible perspectives of Agents and their
Events. Whereas the usual approach in physics would
presuppose an objective world and explain the different
perspectives by ‘carving out’ parts of it to serve as the
perceiving subjects, QBism begins with a fundamental
plurality of perspectives and seeks to derive some notion
of objective concepts from them.
The present work does not aim at a general solution to
the question of objectivity, but focuses on the problem of
how to relate Agents to one another through the relative
refinement of their Apparatuses. To the extent that the
car in the example may be thought of as an Apparatus
for sensing the bump in the road, our aim is to under-
stand how the experiences of Agents like (1) and (2) in
the example above must be formally related to one an-
other. For although they are ostensibly different Agents
experiencing different Events, it is evident that there is
a continuity between them: Agent 1 is conceivable as re-
sulting from an extension of Agent 2 via the means of the
car. The latter is an external System probed by Agent 2
on the one hand, and on the other hand it is an Appara-
tus used by Agent 1. We aim to understand and formalize
this kind of relationship for measurements on quantum
systems. In particular, our goal is to understand in de-
tail how the Agent’s measurement Apparatus for making
quantum measurements can be understood and formally
described as a physical extension of the Agent.
III. EXTENDING THE AGENT
Suppose that the Agent is interested in doing mea-
surements on a System T , which we will refer to as the
‘target System’, but that their repertoire of direct mea-
surements on T is limited. Thus, they would like to find
ways to extend their possibilities of interacting with T
by involving another System S, to serve as an Appa-
ratus. In the following sections, we give an account of
how the System S goes from being merely another Sys-
tem to becoming part of the perceptual Apparatus of the
Agent, and as such, part of the Agent’s ‘body’. We di-
vide this process into two steps. The first step involves
‘tuning’ System S to System T such that measurements
on the former can be used to make inferences about hy-
pothetical measurements on the latter. At this stage,
however, S is still treated as a System external to the
Agent, on which the Agent can perform measurements.
The second step involves re-defining the boundary be-
tween Agent and World so as to include System S as
part of the Agent, which we call the ‘extension of the
Agent’. In the following subsections we describe each of
these steps in detail.
81. Tuning a prospective Apparatus
Not any System can be used immediately as an Appa-
ratus, for the simple reason that measurements on S do
not necessarily have anything to do with measurements
on T . Intuitively, it must first be ‘tuned’ – there must ex-
ist some special composite action the Agent can take that
we call ‘tuning S to T ’, which encompasses any and all
operations that need to be performed to ensure that the
prospective Apparatus is in a position ready to measure
the target System. For instance, if we aim to use a mi-
croscope to view microbes inside a drop of dew, we must
first place the dew on a slide and position the slide on the
microscope stage. Moreover, we need to understand how
to operate the microscope, and perhaps to some extent
how to model the microscope; all of this prior learning
and activity is implicit in the action of tuning. This ex-
ample already hints at the complexity involved in giving
a full account of the process that makes a System suitable
for use by an Agent as an Apparatus. This problem is
discussed at length by Pickering [16], who describes the
tuning process evocatively as a ‘dance of agency’ that
strives to attain a ‘capture of material agency’:
As active, intentional beings, scientists ten-
tatively construct some new machine. They
then adopt a passive role, monitoring the per-
formance of the machine to see whatever cap-
ture of material agency it might effect. Sym-
metrically, this period of human passivity is
the period in which material agency actively
manifests itself. Does the machine perform as
intended? Has an intended capture of agency
been effected? Typically the answer is no, in
which case the response is another reversal of
roles: human agency is once more active in
a revision of modelling vectors, followed by
another bout of human passivity and mate-
rial performance, and so on. The dance of
agency, seen asymmetrically from the human
end, thus takes the form of a dialectic of resis-
tance and accommodation, where resistance
denotes the failure to achieve an intended
capture of agency in practice, and accommo-
dation an active human strategy of response
to resistance, which can include revisions to
goals and intentions as well as to the mate-
rial form of the machine in question and to
the human frame of gestures and social rela-
tions that surround it.
Due to the evident difficulty in giving a characteriza-
tion of the action of tuning that is both mathematically
precise and conceptually general, we will sidestep the is-
sue by focusing instead on the end product, that is, on
characterizing the special relationship between S and T
that is assumed to represent the outcome of a successful
tuning process.
Intuitively, ‘tuning’ is successful if it is possible to sim-
ulate a direct measurement Z on T by actually doing a
direct measurement Y on S. We can formalize this idea
in Hilbert space using the notion of a generalized dilation
of a POVM. First, let us represent the measurements Z
and Y by (with a slight abuse of notation) the POVMs
Z := {Zz : z ∈ Z} and Y := {Yy : y ∈ Y }, satisfying
∑
z∈Z
Zz = 1
T
∑
y∈Y
Yy = 1
S
(10)
with 1T ,1S the identity operators on the Hilbert spaces
HS ,HT of the respective Systems. We now define:
Generalized dilation: The POVM Y is called a gen-
eralized dilation of the POVM Z if both have the same
number of possible results, and there exists an initial
state σ of S and a CPT map
Φ : L(HS ⊗HT ) 7→ L(HS ⊗HT ) , (11)
where L(H) denotes the space of linear operators on H,
such that
Tr [ρZz] = Tr
[
Φ(σ ⊗ ρ)(Yy ⊗ 1
T )
]
∀y = z, (12)
holds for all valid states ρ of T . If we define
ρ′ := TrT [Φ(σ ⊗ ρ)] , (13)
where TrT is the partial trace over HT , this condition
simplifies to:
Tr [ρZz] = Tr [ρ
′Yy] ∀y = z, (14)
In other words, Y is a generalized dilation of Z if we can
simulate Z by performing the following sequence of ac-
tions:
(i) preparing S in the state σ;
(ii) coupling S to T via the map Φ;
(iii) performing Y on S, and then discarding S.
We will say that the measurement Y is a generalized
dilation of Z whenever this is true of the POVMs rep-
resenting these measurements. For future reference, we
will refer to the sequence of actions (i)-(iii) as applying S
to T .
Note that, in the special case where Y is a von-
Neumann measurement, (i.e. its elements are orthogonal
rank-1 projectors), our definition reduces to the standard
notion of a ‘dilation’ of a POVM.
We can now define what characterizes the end goal of
the ‘tuning’ process:
Tuned: System S is tuned to System T with respect
to a set of measurements {Y b : b ∈ B} on S, if each
member of this set can be paired with a measurement
Zb on T such that Y b is a generalized dilation of Zb.
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be formulated purely in terms of probabilities. This is
important to the QBist, who seeks to express quantum
theory purely in terms of constraints on an Agent’s prob-
ability assignments. To see how this is achieved, note
that the defining relation (14) of a generalized dilation
can be neatly expressed as the constraint:
P (z) = P (y) ∀y = z, (15)
together with
P (z) =
d2
T∑
i
[
(dT + 1)p(i)−
1
dT
]
r(z|i) , (16)
where p(i), r(z|i) are the ‘SIC representations’ of the
state ρ and POVM Z, and dT is the dimension of System
T ; and
P (y) =
d2S∑
i
[
(dS + 1)p
′(i)−
1
dS
]
r′(y|i) , (17)
where p′(i), r′(y|i) are the SIC representations of the
state ρ′ and POVM Y and dS the dimension of System
S.
The conjunction of the constraints (15),(16),(17), when
required to hold for all valid states p(i) of T , gives us a
definition for the statement ‘Y as a generalized dilation of
Z’ purely in terms of the Agent’s probability assignments.
We can therefore understand the statement ‘S is tuned
to T ’ as a statement about a constraint on the Agent’s
beliefs about the two Systems. Specifically, it means that
the Agent believes that certain measurements on S are
‘just as good as’, i.e. a proxy for, certain measurements
on T . We will therefore say that, under these conditions,
the System S is a prospective Apparatus for measuring T .
It is not yet a full Apparatus, because it is still regarded
as an System external to the Agent.
Note that the condition (15) can be thought of as a
kind of non-contextuality assumption, namely, that the
probability of result y doesn’t depend on whether it was
measured as part of Y or part of Z. Unlike standard mea-
surement non-contextuality, however, the contexts being
referred to here are not a pair of alternative measure-
ments on the same System, but rather a pair of mea-
surements on two different Systems.
As an analogy, consider using an Ammeter to mea-
sure the current in a wire. The perceived position of the
Ammeter needle is akin to the Event Y b: it represents a
direct measurement of the Ammeter, and only an indirect
measurement of the current. It is a reliable indicator of
the amount of current you would measure if you were to
try measuring it by grasping the electric wire with your
hand (analogous to measuring Zb). The measurement Y b
is therefore a good proxy for Zb, in the restricted sense
that you would assign the same probabilities to the dif-
ferent values of current ‘perceived’ in each case (with the
proviso that the Ammeter has resolution and operating
range comparable to that of human hands). This is what
is captured by the normative constraint (15). Neverthe-
less, the two are evidently quite different perceptual expe-
riences and the correspondence only holds for one special
feature of the respective Events, namely the quantified
amount of current experienced. For other features, such
as the level pain experienced, Y b is not a suitable proxy
for Zb. Incidentally, this example illustrates that the act
of ‘tuning’ a prospective Apparatus to a System is spe-
cific to some particular feature or features of interest, in
this case the quantified current.
2. Incorporating the Apparatus
The action of tuning S to T is not itself sufficient to
elevate S to an Apparatus regarded as part of the Agent.
To attain this designation, we require more than just that
measurements on S ‘simulate’ or are a ‘proxy’ for mea-
surements on T – we require that these become equiva-
lent to direct measurements of T , as it were, ‘through’
the System S. To illustrate this idea, consider the com-
monplace act of trying on a new pair of spectacles. At
first, one regards them at arm’s length and is aware of
the spectacles as an external System. The image that
one perceives through their lenses is perceived as being
‘in the lenses’, or emanating from the lenses of the spec-
tacles. When one has worn the spectacles for a while, a
transition occurs: one ceases to see the glass of the lenses,
and ceases to see the images as being ‘in’ the glass – in-
stead the images are given in perception directly, as it
were, through the glass. The spectacles, in this new mode
of usage, are as good as being an extension of one’s own
eyes. We now formalize this transition, which we will call
the ‘extension of the Agent’.
After tuning, the Agent still regards S as an exter-
nal physical System on which measurements can be
performed, and tuning as an action that she can take
on these Systems that places them into the relation
expressed by (15). However, once the Agent is confident
that (15) holds, she may find it useful to abstract away
from the details of the System S and its interactions
with T . This can be done, for instance, by automating
the procedure and literally placing it inside a ‘black
box’. When a dial on the box is set to ‘b ∈ B’ and a
button is pushed, the box automatically applies S to T
so as to simulate Zb by performing Y b, effortlessly and
without requiring thought or further intervention by the
Agent. At this point, the Agent trusts the functioning
of the box enough to ignore its inner workings, namely,
the System S and the detailed modeling of the coupling
process. She can simply pick it up and start using it as
if it were in fact a direct measurement Zb on the System
T . We can formalize this shift in perception as follows:
Extension of the Agent: At any time, the Agent
is free to postulate that the operation of using a tuned
prospective Apparatus to measure Y b is literally equiv-
alent to making the direct measurement Zb on System
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T . In doing so, she alters her set {Xa : a ∈ A} of direct
measurements to a new set that includes (but is perhaps
not limited to) {Zb : b ∈ B}, where now the actions in-
dexed by b ∈ B are interpreted as ‘perform measurement
Zb directly on System T using the Apparatus’.
Simultaneously, she ceases to regard the System S
as a System; ceases to regard {Y b : b ∈ B} as possible
measurements; and ceases to regard tuning S to T as
a meaningful action. These concepts are subsumed by,
and implicit in, the set of new direct measurements
{Zb : b ∈ B}. We say that the Agent has extended
herself to incorporate the prospective Apparatus S as
the measurements {Zb : b ∈ B} on T . Thereafter, the
means by which the Agent performs the measurements
Zb – what was formerly known as System S – is referred
to simply as the Apparatus.
We note that in the definition above, it was not
specified what is the set of measurements the Agent can
actually perform after incorporating S as an Apparatus,
except that it should include the Zb. There are, in fact,
two natural possibilities: either the Zb are an addition
to the Agent’s pre-existing possible measurements on T ,
which we denote Xa, or else they are a replacement for
them. The first case applies whenever the acquisition of
the Apparatus amounts to the addition of a new tool
to an existing toolset: merely having another tool does
not in itself prevent the Agent from using the previously
existing tools if they wish to. For instance, although
in a certain sense a pair of spectacles ‘replaces’ the
wearer’s eyes while in use, the spectacles can be worn
or removed at will, according to convenience, and the
possession of the spectacles does not preclude the option
of using one’s eyes without spectacles. This category
extends to cases where the usage of the Apparatus is
expensive or difficult. What is at stake here is rather
what measurements are possible to the Agent, however
easy or difficult they may be to implement. The
alternative case is where the physical changes necessary
to employ the new Apparatus are such as to entail that
the old measurements are effectively impossible (except
insofar as they can be achieved by the new Apparatus).
Irreversible physical modifications are in this category.
The distinction between these cases is captured in the
following definitions (hereafter we employ the shorthand
of e.g. {Xa} for the set {Xa : a ∈ A}):
Inclusive extension: The Agent’s new set of possible
measurements is {Xa} ∪ {Zb};
Exclusive extension: The the Agent’s new set of
possible measurements is only {Zb}.
Of particular interest is a special case in which these
two modes of extension are equivalent, which occurs
when {Xa} = ∅, that is, when the Agent has no a pri-
ori means of measuring System T , and can initially only
access it indirectly through the prospective Apparatus
S. In other words, it may happen that the Agent no-
tices that there exist a subset of measurements on S and
preparations of S that can be interpreted as generalized
dilations for some hypothetical preparations p(i) of an
entirely hypothetical System T , in the sense that prob-
ability assignments can be found to satisfy the requisite
constraints (15),(16),(17). The System T is initially ‘hy-
pothetical’ in the sense that it is only accessible via the
newly discovered indirect measurements {Zb} through S.
So long as the latter remains an external System, the re-
ality of T remains merely hypothetical. When S finally is
incorporated as an Apparatus, the {Zb} become the first
direct measurements of T , and it becomes known to the
Agent as a System proper. This shows how new Systems
can be ‘discovered’ in QBism through the refinement of
Apparatuses, as was promised in Sec. II 5.
To see how the ‘extension of the Agent’ results in the
literal extension of the Agent’s body, note that since the
process of incorporating a prospective Apparatus involves
losing some measurements and actions on S and gaining
new ones on T , it amounts to a shifting of the bound-
ary between Agent and World. After its incorporation
by the extension of the Agent, the System S no longer
exists as an external entity, but is replaced by an Appa-
ratus that performs ‘the same’ measurements, only now
directly rather than indirectly, and so is considered part
of the Agent. The World has thus shrunk by losing a
System, but the Agent has grown in gaining an Appara-
tus.
Finally, in referring to the extension as an act of ‘free
postulation’ by the Agent, we mean that there is no ex-
ternal criterion by which the Agent’s decision to extend
themselves can be judged as right or wrong; they cannot
fall prey to a Dutch book argument by choosing to incor-
porate a prospective Apparatus, or not. This is because,
as mentioned in Sec. II, quantum theory does not pre-
scribe how to demarcate the ‘Agent’ from the ‘external
World’; rather, a choice of such demarcation is a prereq-
uisite for applying the tools of quantum theory that must
come from considerations outside of that theory.
IV. COMPARING APPARATUSES
“Ultimately I view QBism as a quest to point
to something in the world and say, that’s in-
trinsic to the world. But I don’t have a con-
clusive answer yet. Let’s take the point of
view that quantum mechanics is a user’s man-
ual. A user’s manual for me. A philosopher
will quickly say, well that’s just instrumental-
ism. ‘Instrumentalism’ is always prefaced by
a ‘just’. But that’s jumping too quickly to
a conclusion. Because you can always ask –
you should always ask – what is it about the
world that compels me to adopt this instru-
ment rather than that instrument?”
– Fuchs, On Participatory Realism [17]
11
In this section, we will define what is meant by a ‘more
accurate’ or ‘more refined’ measurement in QBism, in
a way that makes no reference to supposed pre-existing
‘true values’ of the measured quantity. We will see that
the problem of evaluating the accuracy of an Apparatus
can be framed as a simple decision problem, which can
be formulated entirely in subjective terms. We will find
that an Agent will strictly prefer to use one Apparatus
over another, whenever the former can be used to emu-
late the latter by post-processing of its results, but not
conversely. This defines a partial ‘preference ordering’
among Apparatuses, which turns out to be equivalent
to the the ‘degradability ordering’ of statistical channels
that has been extensively studied in the literature (see
e.g. [18–20]); in particular it allows us to make a connec-
tion with the recently proposed resource theory of quan-
tum measurements [21]. We are thereby able to define an
Apparatus as more accurate or more refined whenever it
is more resourceful. Finally, we use the partial ordering
of Apparatuses given us by the resource theory to make
a simple taxonomy of the different kinds of Agent exten-
sion that are possible, relative to the Agent’s given initial
abilities.
1. What makes an Apparatus more accurate?
To clarify this issue, we introduce the following deci-
sion problem. An Agent is asked to guess the result of a
future Event W , to which they assign a prior probability
P (w). Moreover, before the Event W occurs, the Agent
is allowed to perform a single measurement on System T ,
whose result may provide additional information about
W . Specifically, we assume that the Agent assigns prob-
abilities {qa(x)} to the results of measurements {Xa} on
T , which are decomposed as
qa(x) =
∑
w∈W
qa(x|w)P (w) (18)
where {qa(x|w)} represents the probabilities that the
Agent thinks they would assign to {Xa} if they knew
that W = w. (Incidentally, probability assignments like
the above, in which the Agent anticipates their own fu-
ture probability assignments, play an important role in
QBism. The Dutch book coherence of such assignments
is a result known as the reflection principle [11]). Given
the outcome Xa = x of their chosen measurement, the
Agent guesses the value ofW according to a strategy rep-
resented by a conditional probability function va(w
′|x)
where w′ is the Agent’s guess. Finally, the EventW = w
happens and the Agent receives a reward according to
some utility function u(w′, w), which we assume to be
real-valued but otherwise unconstrained.
One way to motivate this problem is from the point
of view of biology: the Agent may be an organism that
seeks to anticipate some feature of its environment, rep-
resented byW . To do so, the organism uses its senses (its
Apparatus) to measure some proximal part of the envi-
ronment (the System) in order to glean information that
will help it anticipate W . The organism’s guess w′ may
be interpreted as its pre-emptive action in anticipation of
the stimulus W , and the utility function describes how
the organism is rewarded or punished according to how
appropriate its action was in light of w. Another inter-
pretation, more appropriate to the present work, is that
W quantifies some anticipated physical phenomenon, say
the severity of a coming storm, and w′ represents a me-
teorologist’s prediction, based on their readings of some
Apparatus, say a barometer, that is applied to the lo-
cal atmosphere (the System). The utility function then
quantifies the scientist’s reward for making an accurate
prediction. These examples show that our decision prob-
lem is quite general in its applicability, but it also has
limitations. In particular, we only consider the task of
making predictions, disregarding any ‘costs’ that might
be associated with the Apparatus, such as the physiolog-
ical cost to an organism of evolving a new appendage, or
the monetary cost to a scientist of buying a more accu-
rate instrument. In principle one could account for these
by allowing the utility function to depend on more pa-
rameters; however, as we are here aiming for a level of
generality that is not concerned with such particulars,
we leave aside the issue of the costs of different Appara-
tuses to focus on comparing them strictly according to
what measurements they make possible for the Agent in
principle.
Returning to the decision problem in the abstract, our
goal is to compute the Agent’s maximum expected utility,
optimized over all possible guessing strategies va(w
′|x),
for each possible choice of measurement Xa. That is, we
define the maximum expected utility given a measure-
ment Xa as:
umax(X
a) :=
sup
va
∑
w,w′∈W
u(w′, w)va(w
′|x)qa(x|w)P (w) .
(19)
In general, different measurements will perform better or
worse depending on the choice of utility function, which
may depend on the Agent’s personal aims. However,
sometimes one measurement has a higher maximum ex-
pected utility than another measurement for all possible
utility functions. This leads us to a natural definition
of a partial ordering on the set of possible measurements:
Preference ordering: Given two possible measure-
ments Zb and Xa on T , we say that Zb is preferred to
Xa, denoted Zb ≥ Xa, if umax(Zb) ≥ umax(Xa) for any
choice of utility function u(w′, w). We say it is strictly
preferred if the inequality is strict.
The preference ordering is enforced by the following
principle: given a choice between two actions a and
a′, which are rewarded according to a utility function
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u(a), the Agent should choose a instead of a′ whenever
u(a) > u(a′). This decision problem has been studied
previously in the field of noisy channel comparisons (see
e.g. [20]). A key result of Blackwell [19] establishes the
following equivalence, rendered using our own notation:
Theorem (Blackwell): Given measurements on T
represented by the random variables Zb and Xa, the
following are equivalent:
(i) Zb is preferred to Xa, i.e. Zb ≥ Xa;
(ii) qa(x|w) =
∑
z
λ(x|z)qb(z|w);
where λ(x|z) is a conditional probability distribution that
represents some stochastic mixing of the measurement
Zb. Thus, our ‘preference order’ defined above is the
same as the ‘Blackwell’ or ‘degradability’ order studied
elsewhere[18–20]. In the present context, it has the fol-
lowing interpretation: an Agent prefers Zb to Xa when-
ever it is possible to simulate Xa by doing Zb and then
applying the stochastic map defined by λ(x|z) to the re-
sult z. The significant point is that, arguably, an Agent
always has the ability to perform such a re-mapping of
measurement results, which in the quantum information
literature is referred to as a classical post-processing.
Why is this so? It is natural to assume that, on re-
ceiving the result Zb = z, the Agent can invent several
new fictional results z1, z2, . . . , zM , and manufacture a
number m ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M} drawn from an arbitrary dis-
tribution λ(m), and then declare the result of the mea-
surement to be zm instead of z. Furthermore, given any
set of distinct results z, z′, z′′, · · · ∈ Zb, it is natural to
assume that the Agent can conflate these by interpret-
ing all results z, z′, z′′, . . . as a single result z. It can be
shown (a proof is in Ref. [21]) that the ability to perform
these ‘free’ transformations of the result z is sufficient to
enable to Agent to perform an arbitrary stochastic map
λ(x|z) on z. We therefore postulate that the sets of mea-
surements the Agent can actually perform must be closed
under arbitrary classical post-processing of their results.
This postulate allows us to make an immediate
connection to the “Resource Theory of Quantum Mea-
surements” described by Guff et al. [21]. The following
definitions and statements are implied by the results of
that work:
1. The equivalence class of any single measurement
Xa is defined as those measurements related to it by
a reversible classical post-processing. Similarly, the
equivalence class of a set of measurements {Xa} is
the union of the equivalence classes of its individual
members.
2. If Zb ≥ Xa for two non-equivalent measurements,
then the POVM that represents Xa can be obtained by
a classical post-processing of the results of the POVM
that represents Zb. It follows that Zb is more resourceful
than Xa in the formal sense of Ref. [21]. Similarly, a set
{Zb} is more resourceful than another set {Xa} if every
member of the latter can be obtained by a classical
post-processing of a member of {Zb}.
3. The minimally informative measurement I is defined
as a single-result measurement for which the Agent
always assigns unit probability. (Dutch book coherence
guarantees that there always is such a proposition to
which the Agent necessarily ascribes probability 1; it
may be loosely interpreted as the proposition that ‘out
of all things considered possible, one will occur’.) The
equivalence class of I is the unique minimally resourceful
equivalence class: it is less resourceful than every other
equivalence class of measurements. An Agent who can
only perform measurements equivalent to I has nothing
to lose by extending themselves to incorporate a new
Apparatus.
4. A maximally resourceful equivalence class is one for
which there is no more resourceful equivalence class
of measurements. Therefore a maximally resource-
ful equivalence class cannot be obtained by classical
post-processing of any measurements from another
equivalence class. In classical theory (taken to be the
limiting case in which all measurements are represented
by POVMs that are diagonal in a fixed basis) there is
a unique maximally resourceful equivalence class, and
hence a unique ‘best possible Apparatus’. This would
be, for instance, the hypothetical Apparatus presumably
used by Laplace’s Demon to measure the positions
and momenta of all fundamental classical particles to
arbitrary precision. In quantum theory, there exists
a distinct maximally resourceful equivalence class for
every distinct POVM whose elements are all rank-1
(not necessarily orthogonal), because such POVMs
cannot be transformed into one another by classical
post-processing. Quantum theory therefore admits
a rich abundance of distinct maximally resourceful
Apparatuses. These include the equivalence classes of
the various Von-Neumann measurements, as well as the
equivalence classes of the various SIC-POVMs.
2. A taxonomy of extensions
Consider an Agent who initially is only able to perform
a set of measurements {Xa} directly on System T , and
can do another set of measurements {Y b} directly on a
prospective Apparatus S. After performing a extension
of the Agent as described in Sec. III, the latter are trans-
formed into a new set {Zb} of direct measurements on
T . We argued in Sec. III that the extension refers to a
physical addition to the Agent’s body in the sense that a
System S previously belonging to the external World is
subsumed as part of the Agent. However, commonplace
examples show that a physical extension does not always
correspond to an extension of the Agent’s sensory pow-
ers: a badly designed pair of spectacles can just as well
inhibit the Agent’s vision as assist it. This is formally
the case whenever the newly acquired set of POVMs is
strictly less resourceful than the Agent’s originally pos-
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sible measurements, i.e. the case when {Zb} < {Xa}.
More generally, we can identify four distinct cases of in-
terest:
• Downgrade: {Zb} < {Xa};
• Upgrade: {Zb} > {Xa};
• Duplicate: {Zb} = {Xa};
• Innovation: None of the above
(denoted {Zb} 6= {Xa})
When we take into account whether the mode of incor-
poration is Inclusive or Exclusive according to the defini-
tions given in Sec. III, we obtain 8 distinct classes, shown
in Table I. In the Table, ‘Final measurements’ indicates
the equivalence class of measurements after incorporating
the Apparatus, and the final column shows how it com-
pares to the Agent’s original measurements {Xa}. We
use the notation ‘ 6=’ to indicate when two equivalence
classes are not comparable by the ordering relation, that
is, where each set contains measurements that cannot be
obtained from the other set by classical post-processing.
It may be immediately observed that Duplicate ex-
tensions and the Inclusive Downgrade extension are all
equivalent. This is intuitive as can be seen by the follow-
ing example. If you have a barometer, then you are in-
different to any of the following: acquiring an additional
identical barometer; replacing your barometer with an
identical one; and acquiring an additional less accurate
barometer. It is little surprise that an Exclusive Down-
grade is the only strictly non-preferred extension. By
contrast, for an Upgrade it does not matter whether it is
Inclusive or Exclusive.
Perhaps the most interesting cases are the Innovations.
Although not explicitly stated in the Table, an Inclusive
Innovation ≥ Exclusive Innovation, as can be seen by
comparing their sets of Final measurements. It can also
be deduced that an Inclusive Innovation is never less re-
sourceful than {Xa}, and so is always preferred to an
Exclusive Downgrade. Beyond this, little can be said
about them on the basis of the resource-theory alone;
other considerations must be taken into account, such as
the Agent’s particular goals. For instance, changing Ap-
paratuses by an Exclusive Innovation requires the Agent
to forfeit at least some measurements that were previ-
ously possible in order to obtain others that were pre-
viously impossible. If the Agent has no use for the new
measurements and desperately needed the ones that were
forfeit, the change is just as detrimental as an Exclusive
Downgrade. On the other hand, if the newly gained mea-
surements are useful and the forfeited measurements were
not important to the Agent, then the change is as good
as an Upgrade.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
We began this work by pointing out the ambiguous
character of scientific instruments, asking: how can they
be regarded both as external Systems to be tuned and
calibrated, and yet also be regarded as an extension of
the scientist’s senses? This would pose no great difficulty
if we could interpret “extension of the scientist’s senses”
as merely a figure of speech, and insist that the instru-
ments are always external to their users, as traditionally-
minded physicists might insist. But this avenue is not
available to QBism, one of whose tenets is that the in-
strument is literally a part of the Agent using it.
This brings out most clearly that the notion of ‘Agent’
in QBism is not confined to an individual person, which
is a point that QBists have emphasized before [22]. What
has remained mysterious is precisely how QBism delin-
eates the boundary between Agent andWorld in their for-
malism, and how this boundary can move. The present
work has achieved more clarity on these points.
To summarize, we have seen that the boundary be-
tween Agent and World is formally delineated by the set
of possible direct measurements that an Agent can per-
form, and the Systems to which they are targeted (which
depends on the Agent’s probability assignments to the
measurements). To specify these details is also to specify
the Agent’s sensory body, at least in its quantifiable as-
pects that are relevant for doing scientific measurements.
Furthermore we have seen how this boundary can move
via the two-step process of tuning and extension of the
Agent. Tuning is an interactive process between Agent
and an external System that establishes necessary con-
ditions for the System to be regarded as an Apparatus.
Once these are met, the Agent may extend themselves
by mapping details about the prospective Apparatus into
the Agent’s set of possible direct measurements, thereby
incorporating it.
Although there is no fundamental rule that governs
the placement of the boundary a priori, there are rules
about how it can move once it has been placed. This in
turn allows us to establish a continuity between an Agent
before and after incorporating an Apparatus: the two can
be related by showing that the possible measurements of
the latter can be obtained from the former via the two-
step process we have described.
As an addendum, we note that the process of exten-
sion can also be carried out in reverse. That is, at any
moment, an Agent might choose to ‘deconstruct’ a mea-
surement Zb on System T by postulating the existence
of an auxiliary System D such that measurement W b on
D is a proxy for Zb. The Agent may then choose to
cease to regard the latter as a direct measurement on
T , and instead interpret it as being in fact the result of
measuring W b on D. Running the process in this direc-
tion is not unique, as there are infinite choices of D and
W b that would do the trick. Nevertheless, as before, the
Agent is free to postulate one of these as being the one
that correctly describes the situation, and this entails a
redefinition of the boundary between Agent and World.
This may be useful in describing what happens when an
Agent’s Apparatus breaks and ceases to function as such,
thereby becoming conspicuous to the Agent as an exter-
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TABLE I. Types of extension by resourcefulness
Case Final measurements Comparison to {Xa}
Downgrade, Exclusive {Zb} <
{Zb} < {Xa} Inclusive {Xa} =
Duplicate, Exclusive {Xa} =
{Zb} = {Xa} Inclusive {Xa} =
Upgrade, Exclusive {Zb} >
{Zb} > {Xa} Inclusive {Zb} >
Innovation, Exclusive {Zb} 6=
{Zb} 6= {Xa} Inclusive {Xa, Zb} 6=
nal System.
By defining the rules of Agent extension, we have been
able to clarify several points. First, we were able to es-
tablish a connection to the resource theory of quantum
measurements, which allowed us to give a formal charac-
terization of why an Agent would consider one Appara-
tus superior to another for the purposes of measurement,
without appealing to pre-existing ‘true values’ of quan-
tities. Secondly, we have doubled down on the QBist
notion that an Agent using an Apparatus ‘directly expe-
riences’ the results given through the Apparatus. Thus,
QBism accommodates the idea that a sufficiently prac-
ticed scientist using an electron microscope to measure
atoms might be said to literally ‘sense atoms’ and not
merely be making inferences about them as abstract or
hypothetical entities [23].
Finally, a caveat: although we have stressed that the
placement of the Agent-World boundary is not subject to
any fundamental constraints, this is not to say that its
application to a given actual experiment or example is
always appropriate. For one thing, all prospective parts
of an Agent should be tuned to one another, and as dis-
cussed in Sec. III we have left out the details of what this
tuning process involves. Evidently the physical aspects
of an Agent’s interactions with an external System will
play a role in determining how easy or difficult it is for
the Agent to tune that System; there is a reason why it
is easy to pick up a cane and start using it as an exten-
sion of one’s arm, while using a chair or a piece of string
for the same purpose can be difficult or impossible. To
account for such differences, an in-depth analysis of the
tuning process would be required.
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